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Sammendrag 
Vi undersøker den kausale effekten av antall skoleår på bruken av uførepensjon ved å studere 
utvidelsen av obligatorisk skolegang in Norge i 1960-årene. Enkle regresjoner av mottak av 
uførepensjon på fullførte år med skolegang tilsier en svært sterk negativ sammenheng mellom 
utdanning og bruk av uførepensjon, spesielt i den nedre delen av utdanningsfordelingen. Gitt styrken i 
denne observerte sammenhengen, kunne en mistenke at forbedringer i fullførte skoleår skulle lede til 
lavere mottak av uførepensjon og lette en byrde på offentlige budsjetter gjennom slike 
trygdeordninger. Vår analyse av utvidelsen av obligatorisk skolegang fra 7 til 9 år i Norge på 1960-
tallet viser imidlertid ingen effekt på bruken av uførepensjon for 50-åringer som følge av økt 
skolegang, med et konfidensintervall som tilsier at i beste fall bare en liten del av den observerte 
sammenhengen mellom utdanning og uførepensjonsmottak kan forklares med en kausal effekt av 
skolegang på uførepensjonering. 
1 Introduction
The past decade has seen a surge in the literature studying the casual eﬀects of educa-
tion on health, see Eide and Showalter (2011) and Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2011) for recent
reviews. The results from these recent studies are, however, far from conclusive. Using exoge-
nous variation induced by complusory schooling laws, Lleras-Muney (2005) ﬁnds a large eﬀect
of education on mortality in the US and evidence in Lager and Torssander (2012) also suggests
there is some eﬀect in Sweden, but other studies of changes in compulsory schooling have
failed to conﬁrm eﬀects on mortility for France (Albouy and Lequien, 2009), the UK (Clark
and Royer, 2010) or even in alternative analyses from the US (Mazumder, 2008). However,
further studies have found eﬀects of schooling in self-reported health (Silles, 2009), hospital-
ization (Arendt, 2008), poor health (Oreopoulos, 2007) and hypertension (Powdthavee, 2010),
but others fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect on similar outcomes, see e.g., Arendt (2005) for self-
reported health and BMI or Jürges et al. (2011) for biomarkers related to cardio-vascular
disease.
This current study looks at the possible causal eﬀects of education on use of publicly
funded disability pensions (DP) in Norway by exploiting the exogenous variation in school-
ing brought about by a major comprehensive compulsory schooling reform. In contrast to
self-reported health status, which can be subject to bias in reporting and self-assessment,
disability pension receipt requires that a person has undergone extensive medical evaluation
to determine whether disease or disability prevents him or her from pursuing gainful em-
ployment. In all but the most obvious cases of extreme disability, other alternatives, such
as re-training or transfer to diﬀerent tasks or positions, have been attempted, often under
the guidance of the social security agency. We also brieﬂy consider mortality, both as a
health-related outcome in its own right and as an outcome which might confound results on
disability pension use. In looking at public-funded disability beneﬁts, we move the discussion
away from direct eﬀects on disease, death or self-perception of “healthiness” and toward an
outcome that also reﬂects the fact that health outcomes - and the manner in which these
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might be aﬀected by education - are relevant for social security systems. Because of the
high costs of publicly funded disability pension programs, the eﬀects of education on use of
public disability is relevant for a number of countries. Indeed, in recent years a number of
commentators have expressed concern about the high level of spending on disability-related
beneﬁts and the high levels of disability pension use in the US as well as many other OECD
countries (Burkhauser and Daly, 2002; Autor and Duggan, 2006; OECD, 2010). Norway is
noted for having particularly high levels of spending on disability beneﬁts, due to both the
high incidence of disability pensioners in the population and a particularly generous level of
beneﬁts (OECD, 2006).
The reform studied here extended compulsory education in Norway from 7 to 9 years over
a period of several years, predominantly in the 1960s, and increased educational levels for
precisely that part of the distribution of educational attainment for which disability pension
use is the highest in Norway. If general education has a profound eﬀect on disability pension
use and/or marginal eﬀects of education are larger at low levels of education, then one would
expect just such a reform to be particularly potent in inﬂuencing use of disability beneﬁts.
Also, the manner in which the reform was implemented makes it particularly suited to analysis
within a quasi-experimental framework, since introduction of the reform at diﬀerent times in
diﬀerent areas allows for better control of general time trends.
The potential for non-linearities in the relationship between schooling and disability pen-
sions requires that we give careful consideration to how we assess the potential magnitude
of the reform eﬀects. In particular, basic results from a linear speciﬁcation in ordinary least
squares regression (OLS) will tend to understate the true magnitude of the relationship be-
tween education and DP at lower levels of education (and vice versa at higher levels) if the
non-linearities are such that people with lower levels of education are much more likely to be
on disability. Thus, given that the reform we analyze primarily aﬀects educational attain-
ment at the lower end of the education distribution, if we were to use the basic OLS results
to gain a benchmark estimate of the potential magnitude for improved education (assuming
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exogeneity of education), then we would be underestimating the potential of the reform to
aﬀect DP if non-linearities in marginal eﬀects by educational level exist. This would, in
turn, also inﬂuence assessment of the extent of possible endogeneity when comparing re-
sults from a quasi-experimental analysis (Lochner and Moretti, 2011; Løken et al., 2012).
When exploiting the reform as an instrumental variable (IV) with two-stage least squares
(2SLS), the IV-estimate of the eﬀect of education implicitly accounts for such non-linearities
and thereby adjusts for the varying eﬀects of the reform when inﬂuencing educational at-
tainment in diﬀerent parts of the education distribution. Thus, in order to gain a proper
understanding of the magnitude of any estimated eﬀects – as well as evaluate the precision of
the IV/2SLS estimates – we need to adjust the baseline OLS estimates to better reﬂect the
relative eﬀectiveness of the reform in inﬂuencing educational attainment at diﬀerent levels.
We are unable to uncover evidence of a causal eﬀect of education on disability pension use
by age 50, an age at which we could reasonably expect to ﬁnd an eﬀect. We can easily reject
causal eﬀects of the magnitude suggested by OLS estimates. Furthermore, once we carefully
analyze the substantial non-linearities in the relationship between education and DP, even
the upper range of our conﬁdence intervals suggests that any causal eﬀect of education is, at
best, of a much smaller magnitude than suggested by descriptive evidence or basic OLS. In
other words, our results show that, at most, only a very small proportion of the relationship
between education and DP use suggested by descriptive or OLS analysis might be causal in
nature. The eﬀects of education on mortality are not estimated with the same precision as for
disability and we can not rule out eﬀects of the same magnitude as suggested by non-linear
OLS at typical conﬁdence levels. However, our results certainly do suggest that the causal
eﬀects of education on mortality are not larger than those estimated with OLS, in contrast
to the ﬁndings in e.g. Lleras-Muney (2005).
The following section provides brief descriptive evidence on the relationship between ed-
uation and use of DP in Norway followed by a discussion of why we might expect to ﬁnd a
causal eﬀect of education on health in general and on disability pension use in particular.
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Section 3 oﬀers further details of the Norwegian compulsory schooling reform and describes
the data used in this analysis. Section 4 outlines the econometric methods and empirical
speciﬁcations used in the analysis, including details on the weighting scheme implicit in in-
strumental variables (IV) estimation. Details on how we take non-linearities in the eﬀect of
education into account in our analysis are also provided there. The results are presented in
Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Education, health and uptake of disability pension
The Norwegian system of publicly-funded disability pensions guarantees a decent standard
of living to persons aged 18-67 who are permanently unable to pursue gainful employment
due to illness, injury or ill-health. Individuals must have gone through a careful medical
evaluation and appropriate treatments as well as attempted re-training, where possible, before
receiving permanent disability beneﬁts. The illness or disability must be of a nature that the
person is unable to work more than 49% of full-time. The level of beneﬁts is calculated by
means of a complicated formula based on previous earnings and employment. Persons with
little previous earnings or employment are granted a minumum pension. During the past
couple of decades, roughly 10 % of the working age population (18-66) has been on disability
in Norway (?.
As documented by Figure 1, a clear and profound diﬀerence in DP uptake by educational
level exists in Norway for both men and women by age 50. The largest diﬀerence appears to be
between low levels of education and schooling at the secondary level, whereas decreases in DP
use beyond the secondary level, i.e. over 12 years of education, are less pronounced. As many
as 15-20% of persons with the lowest levels of education (7 or 8 years) are already on disability
by age 50. At levels of education beyond secondary school (13+ years of education), about
5% or less are on disability by age 50. As the ﬁgure documents, the relationship between DP
and educational attainment appears to be non-linear.
The literature generally distinguishes between three possible explanations for the the ob-
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Figure 1: Disability pension use at age 50 by educational attainment. Birth cohorts 1950-
1958.
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served relationship between education and health-related outcomes and behaviors: selection,
reverse causation and a true causal eﬀect. Selection might work through other factors that
aﬀect both educational attainment and DP. Diﬀerences in time preferences such that per-
sons who value the future more are both more likely to abstain from current earnings in
order to obtain higher education leading to higher earnings in the future and to invest in
health-promoting behaviors are a much cited example (Fuchs, 1982). Similarly, individuals
with higher earnings ability might ﬁnd it worthwhile both to obtain higher education and to
limit detrimental health outcomes in order to avoid (larger) future earnings losses. Among
other factors, Conti et al. (2010) and Conti and Heckman (2010) also consider early child-
hood endowments that aﬀect both educational and health outcomes. The typically strong
relationship between education and health might, however, also reﬂect a situation in which
one of the consequences of poor health is lower educational attainment rather than vice versa
Currie (2009). This can easily be the case for certain types of health problems which make
it more diﬃcult for an individual to obtain more education.
In discussing the factors and mechanisms which might generate a causal eﬀect of schooling
on disability pensions we can, in turn, distinguish between two general types of explanations.
The ﬁrst relates to the more general discussion of how education can create diﬀerences in
health-related behaviours and outcomes in general, see, for example, Grossman (2006). The
second revolves around incentive structures created by the social security system.
Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) carefully consider and empirically explore a number
of alternative channels by which education might aﬀect health outcomes and health-related
behaviors. After considering the evidence in a descriptive analysis, they conclude that there is
little evidence that points to the gradient being attributable to diﬀerences in price responses,
time preference or risk aversion, but there is some evidence for other channels studied. Higher
levels of income due to higher education provide better opportunities for purchasing health
insurance or health-promoting services as well as imply higher utility associated with living
to an older age; their empirical results document that diﬀerences in resources do indeed
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account for some of the relationship between schooling and health. Futhermore, Cutler and
Lleras-Muney (2010) suggest that it is not simply diﬀerences in speciﬁc (factual) health
knowledge that can generate the observed education gradient in health - although these
also seem to matter - but that diﬀerences in cognitive ability or the ability to process and
fully understand the context of health-related knowledge is important. Skills attributable to
education can be assumed to aﬀect a person’s ability to read and understand information
about disease, disease control and disease prevention; the ability to understand treatment
alternatives and patients’ rights; the ability to understand and follow treatment instructions
and, ﬁnally, understanding of how to take care of one’s health, such as with good general
nutrition. Controlling for cognitive ability does indeed help to explain part of the education
gradient in health in Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010). Similarly, diﬀerences in non-cognitive
skills, personality measures and social integration also appear as mediating factors.
Many of these main ﬁndings are also echoed in Conti et al. (2010) and Conti and Heckman
(2010), who provide a framework by which to distinguish between relevant early childhood
endowments when determining the causal part of the relationship between health and edu-
cation. They show that cognitive, noncognitive and health endowments developed early in
life (by age 10) are important factors in educational attainment as well as the generation
of health outcomes and behaviors at age 30. With their methods the proportion of vari-
ous health-related outcomes which can be viewed as causally related to education is also
estimated. Their work indicates that, for example, selection into education attributable to
factors from early childhood explains more than half of the observed educational gradient in
such outcomes as general poor health, depression and obesity while for other health-related
behaviors, in particular smoking, the causal eﬀect of education is much more profound.
While health surely plays a role in eligibility for disability, health status may not be the
only determinant of disability uptake. Type of occupation can inﬂuence the extent to which
an individual is able to remain employed when struck by disease or injury. Futhermore,
earnings replacement rates in social security systems generally create diﬀerent incentives de-
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pending on work history, especially with varying degrees of incapacitation. Both occupation
and earnings can themselves be aﬀected by education. In particular, it seems likely that
higher educational attainment makes it more likely that a person is able to avoid manual
labor, which decreases the chance of many types of physical injury and illness. Jobs with
higher status and more job control may also reduce psychological strain and stress. Such
factors are documented to be associated with lower disability uptake in Norway (Krokstad
et al., 2002).
Replacement rates within the beneﬁts system decrease with earning in Norway as well as
many other countries (OECD, 2010). If education increases earnings, higher earnings imply
lower replacement rates, and lower replacement rates aﬀect incentives for disability uptake,
then education will also aﬀect disability through such pecuniary channels. The eﬀects of
incentives on disability pension uptake has been previously studied by Parsons (1980), and
these original strong results have been debated, see e.g. the exchange between Bound (1989,
1991) and Parsons (1991). More recent quasi-experimental evidence suggests some eﬀect of
incentives on disability pension uptake, see e.g. Gruber (2000) or Chen and van der Klaauw
(2008) for analyses of data from Canada and the US or Brinch (2009) and Kostøl and Mogstad
(2012) for analyses of the Norwegian disability pension program studied here.
Previous studies document the eﬀectiveness of the Norwegian compulsory schooling reform
in raising education levels, primarily at the lower tail of the education distribution (Aakvik
et al., 2010). Also, the reform has been shown to generate returns to education, i.e. have
a causal eﬀect on earnings (Aakvik et al., 2010), and to aﬀect the cognitive abilities of men
in early adulthood, as measured by the cognitive ability (“IQ”) test from the universal draft
assessment for the Norwegian military (Brinch and Galloway, 2012). 1 Thus, given the
particularly large diﬀerence in disability uptake when moving from low to middle levels of
education and the documented eﬀectiveness of the reform in aﬀecting outcomes and behaviors
1The eﬀect of the reform on other outcomes is also discussed in a number of other papers, including
Black et al. (2008); Monstad et al. (2008) on female fertility and Black et al. (2005) on intergenerational
transmission of human capital.
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that appear relevant for understanding disability uptake, there would have been good reason
to expect the reform to also have had an eﬀect on disability pension use.
3 Empirical strategy and Data
The schooling reform studied in this paper was introduced in diﬀerent municipalities
in Norway at diﬀerent times over the course of many years, primarily in the 1960s. The
reform raised compulsory schooling from 7 years to 9 years. Almost 20 percent of the pupils
completed less than 9 years of schooling prior to the reform. In addition to increasing the
number of years pupils stayed in school, the reform may also have aﬀected the quality of
education. Prior to the reform, two diﬀerent types of educational institutions existed at
the middle school level, i.e. beyond the compulsory 7-year basic education. Realskole was
academically oriented and prepared students for further education at the upper secondary
level. Framhaldsskole oﬀered basic practical or vocational education, mostly in one-year
courses. Both schooling types were not oﬀered in all municipalities and travelling distances
in many communities would have made education beyond the compulsory level prohibitively
expensive for many youths in rural Norway. We can assume that pupils who would have
attended the non-academic schools prior to the reform were able to receive high-quality
education under the reform regime, since the reform provided them with education at a
higher level closer to home. Further details on both the refom and the data used in this
analysis can be found in Brinch and Galloway (2012). 2
The key advantage of this reform for research purposes is that it was implemented in
diﬀerent municipalities in diﬀerent years, giving rise to diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence identiﬁcation
of the eﬀects of reform. In addition, because essentially all municipalities introduced the
reform at some point, the standard limitation of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence that we need to as-
sume parallell counterfactual trends for treatment and control groups is somewhat alleviated.
Since all municipalities are in both treatment and control groups (albeit at diﬀerent times),
2Extensive narratives on the reform as well as educational structure in Norway at the time are available
in Norwegian in Telhaug (1982) and Myhre (1992).
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idiosyncratic trends are not a problem unless these trends are not linear in nature. The
timing of the reform in diﬀerent municipalities was not explicitly randomized, but a clear
objective was to ensure that the early years of the reform (referred to as a “trial” at the time)
encompassed diverse municipalities. There is little evidence suggesting correlations between
characteristics of the municipalities and timing of the reform (Lie, 1973). There are many
similarities between this reform and a compulsory schooling reform introduced somewhat
earlier in Sweden, see Holmlund (2008), used for analysing the eﬀect of education on health
outcomes in Lager and Torssander (2012) and Meghir et al. (2012).
This project utilizes data from a number of diﬀerent comprehensive administrative regis-
ters encompassing the entire resident population of Norway. A person’s place of residence at
age 14, i.e. when he or she would have started 8th grade under the new educational system,
is used to establish whether or not he/she would have been oﬀered middle school education
under the old or new educational system; such data on municipality of residence is available
starting in 1964, and for this reason we focus on cohorts born after 1949. Data on highest
level of educational attainment at age 30 was taken from the Norwegian national educational
database (NUDB) and the detailed (six-digit) educational coding includes information on
both level and type of schooling completed3. The data allow us to distinguish between the
diﬀerent types of pre-reform schooling (7-year compulsory primary school, framhaldsskole,
and realskole) and the new type of post-reform compulsory middle school education. There
was a change of practice for registration of education lengths of 11 years (some education at
the secondary level) for cohorts born after 1958, so we choose to exclude birth cohorts born
after 1958. In other words, we are able to study outcomes for birth cohorts born 1950-1958
and cover therefore reform implementation in all but the very small minority of municipalities
that introduced the reform either before 1964 or after 1972.
3The basis for the data on educational obtainment in NUDB starts with the 1970 census. From 1974
onward updated information on educational participation and attainment has then been collected directly
from (all) eductional institutions in the country. Due to the “missing” data from 1971-1973, complete
information on educational attainment was ﬁrst available after corrections and updating could take place in
conjunction with the 1980 census.
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As a result of a major restructuring of municipalities during the early 1960s, a large
number of municpialities merged (or were split up) and the total number of municipalities
was reduced dramatically. In some cases, a municipality which had already introduced the
reform merged with another community that had not yet implemented the reform. The
merging or splitting up of municipalities forced us to exclude all persons in the aﬀected
municipalities from further analysis except in rare cases when reform timing and municipal
mergers were compatible with respect to identifying reform timing. Furthermore, information
on implementation of the reform in Oslo exhibited some inconsistencies, i.e. the appearance
then disappearance of a number of new types of middle schools several years before full reform
implementation in the capital city (Statistics Norway, 1964). Altogether, such “institutional”
diﬃculties forced us to exclude roughly 20 % of municipalities (in existence in 1964) and 22
% of persons in the relevant birth cohorts. For another 18 % of individuals in the relevant
cohorts (27 % of municipalities), the patterns exhibited in the data were insuﬃcient to
pinpoint the timing of the reform. This would be generally be the case for very small
municipalities–of which there were many in Norway at the time–where the educational choices
of just a small handful of students would have been enough to mask any sharp change in
educational attainment due to the reform. Altogether, we were able to identify reform timing
for a majority (roughly 60 percent) of the 1950-1958 birth cohorts. Since there was some
indication of the last pre-reform cohorts having been aﬀected by the pending reform, we
consider the last pre-reform cohort in each municipality as partially treated and exclude
them from the analysis. For further details on pinpointing and validating reform years for
diﬀerent municipalities, consult Brinch and Galloway (2012).4
Given that disability pension use can, in many cases, be related to severe health problems,
there is a danger that mortality might introduce non-random selection in the population for
analysis. For this reason, our main outcome of interest will be a variable indicating whether
a person is on disability or deceased by age 50, but we also present separate results for DP
4The data on the reform are exactly the same in this study and in Brinch and Galloway (2012).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Birth cohort 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Full population
Education length 11.911 12.002 12.068 12.129 12.176 12.230 12.273 12.405 12.461
(stand. dev.) (2.582) (2.581) (2.548) (2.542) (2.513) (2.487) (2.434) (2.387) (2.373)
Disability, age 50 0.101 0.101 0.104 0.104 0.105 0.100 0.100 0.094 0.091
Full disability 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.077 0.076 0.074 0.077 0.073 0.072
Dead by age 50 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.037
Female 0.487 0.485 0.487 0.489 0.491 0.488 0.490 0.490 0.489
# observations 57.243 55.480 57.253 57.734 57.245 58.020 59.047 57.699 57.902
Sample for analysis
Education length 11.890 11.993 12.065 12.114 12.182 12.207 12.274 12.395 12.459
(stand. dev.) (2.568) (2.557) (2.534) (2.524) (2.522) (2.474) (2.439) (2.391) (2.374)
Disability, age 50 0.105 0.104 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.104 0.101 0.096 0.093
Full disability 0.079 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.077 0.078 0.074 0.074
Death by age 50 0.041 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.036 0.037
Female 0.485 0.484 0.485 0.487 0.490 0.488 0.492 0.487 0.488
Reform 0.163 0.307 0.430 0.502 0.575 0.693 0.806 0.877 0.932
# observations 32.633 32.012 33.275 33.713 33.484 34.073 34.856 34.322 34.263
alone (where death is classiﬁed as not being on DP) and mortality alone, i.e. having died
by age 50, in order to evaluate whether mortality might be a major issue inﬂuencing results.
Data on deaths were taken from the populations registers available from Statistics Norway.
Table 1 presents the basic descriptive statistics on the full population of cohorts being
studied as well as the subset of individuals for whom we could identify the timing of the
reform and were therefore included in the analysis. We see that the there is little diﬀerence
in key variables between the full population and the sample used in analysis.
4 Econometric methods
4.1 Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences and linear instrumental variables
In general, we are interested in studying the eﬀect of (years of) schooling on binary out-
come yi, which in this paper is an indicator for DP use, mortality or a combined DP/mortality
outcome variable. This relationship is speciﬁed in terms of a linear regression linear proba-
15
bility model (LPM):
yi = x
′
iβ + γsi + i (1)
where yi = 1 if the individual receives disability beneﬁts (and/or is dead) and zero otherwise,
i is an error term, xi is a vector of relevant covariates, including a constant term, β is a
vector of parameters to be estimated, and si is years of schooling such that the parameter γ
captures the estimated eﬀect of education on disability pension use. The main issue in this
analysis is whether and/or to what extent schooling aﬀects DP. In particular, if schooling is
correlated with other factors that aﬀect disability (and/or death), then si as speciﬁed in (1)
would be endogenous with respect to such outcomes and ordinary least squares (or similar)
estimators of γ will be inconsistent.
One way to address such an endogeneity problem is to ﬁnd an instrumental variable (IV),
ri, which is correlated with education but otherwise uncorrelated with the error term in (1),
conditional on the vector xi. We specify
si = xiθ + ρri + υi (2)
where υi is another error term, and ρ a parameter capturing the relationship between school-
ing and the instrument. In such a case, we can then apply an appropriate method, such as
indirect least squares, to estimate γ. More speciﬁcally, inserting (2) into (1) yields
yi = α + γθ + x
′
iβ + γρri + γυi + i = κ + x
′
iβ + λri + ζi (3)
with κ = α + γθ,λ = γρ, and ζ = γυi + i. Thus, the ﬁnal estimate of γ can be obtained by
dividing the λˆ estimated from OLS in equation (3) by the ρˆ estimated from OLS in equation
(1).
In this analysis, the vector xi includes indicators for time and municipality of residence
(at age 14). Treatment (reform) status is the instrument, ri, and is determined by year of
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birth in relation to timing of the reform in each individual’s municipality of residence at age
14, i.e. ri = 1 if it is reasonable to assume, based on birth cohort, place of residence at age
14 and timing of the reform, that a person would have attended 8th grade under the new
schooling system, and ri = 0 otherwise. Estimation of equation (3) provides the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimate of the eﬀect of the reform on DP, λˆ, and estimation of equation (2)
results in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate of the eﬀect of the reform on schooling, ρˆ.
The IV estimate is then the ratio of these two eﬀects. To the extent the reform might also
have increased the quality (and not only the quantity) of education obtained, the IV estimate
would violate the typical exclusion restriction implicit in IV-estimation leading to upward
bias in the magnitude of the eﬀect of years of education on DP.
4.2 The implicit estimand of linear IV for nonlinear relationships
Descriptive evidence on the relationship between education and DP (see Figure 1) gives
us reasonable grounds to suspect that the eﬀect of years of schooling is non-linear, i.e. that
the magnitude of the marginal eﬀect of increased education varies over level of education. As
discussed in Lochner and Moretti (2011) and Løken et al. (2012), OLS and IV estimates entail
diﬀerent linear combinations of the margin-speciﬁc eﬀects at diﬀerent levels of education. In
OLS that linear combination is a form of weighted average of the marginal eﬀects at diﬀerent
margins. IV is, instead, a linear combination of margin-speciﬁc eﬀects with coeﬃcients that
can be estimated from the data. Intuitively, the weights for OLS reﬂect the entire distribution
of education in the population under analysis, whereas the linear combination coeﬃcients for
IV reﬂect the margins at which the instrument (reform) shifts educational attainment. In
the presence of non-linear eﬀects, these diﬀerent linear combinations in OLS and IV can
lead to diﬀerent estimates of the magnitude of the eﬀect of interest even in the absence of
endogeneity problems in OLS.
In the following we brieﬂy show how the IV and OLS estimands can be expressed as
linear combinations of marginal eﬀects based on similar discussions in Lochner and Moretti
(2011) and Løken et al. (2012). We further proceed to describe how we construct benchmark
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comparison measures for the IV estimators that converge to the same limit as these estimators
under the assumption of exogeneity of education. Because OLS is a linear combination of
such marginal eﬀects the benchmark measure reweights the original OLS estimates to take
explicit account of the margins aﬀected by the reform we study.
To understand the weighting scheme of an OLS estimate in the case of a non-linear
relationship, deﬁne indicator variables δis = 1 {si > s} for discrete levels of education, s =
smin, . . . , smax. The indicator function 1{} takes the value 1 if the argument is true and the
value 0 if the argument is false. It now follows that
si = smin +
smax∑
j=smin
δij. (4)
and the general non-linear relationship between education and disability can be written as
yi = α + x
′
iβ + Σsmaxj=sminγjδij + i. (5)
To see how the OLS estimator of γ can be written as a weighted average of the marginal
eﬀects, γj, we ﬁrst deﬁne s∗i = si − φˆxi, where φˆ is the OLS estimate of the linear regression
of si on xi. The OLS estimator of γ can now be expressed as the empirical analog of
γOLS =
Cov(s∗i , yi)
V ar(s∗i )
(6)
Inserting yi from equation (5), we ﬁnd that
γOLS =
smax∑
j=smin
γj
Cov(s∗i , δij)
V ar(s∗i )
+ Cov(s
∗
i , i)
V ar(s∗i )
, (7)
where the latter term is zero under the exogeneity assumption. Hence, the model that
speciﬁes the expected outcome as a linear function of s estimates a weighted average of the
marginal eﬀects of s on the expected outcome.
With similar reasoning, the estimator of γ obtained with the aid of instrument r can be
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expressed as the empirical analog of
γIV =
Cov(r∗i , yi)
Cov(r∗i , si)
, (8)
where r∗i = ri − τˆxi, where τˆ is the OLS estimate of the linear regression of ri on xi. Inserting
from equation (5), we ﬁnd
γIV =
smax∑
j=smin
γj
Cov(r∗i , δij)
Cov(r∗i , si)
+ Cov(r
∗
i , i)
Cov(r∗i , si)
, (9)
where the latter term is zero under the assumption that the instrument is exogenous. Equa-
tion (9) shows that the IV estimate is a linear combination of marginal eﬀects, γj, with
the linear combination coeﬃcients deﬁned as Cov(r∗i , δij)/Cov(r∗i , si). By comparing with
equation (6) it is clear that in a case with non-linear marginal eﬀects the coeﬃcients used
to construct the linear combination of marginal eﬀects in IV diﬀers from the corresponding
coeﬃcients used in OLS except in the special case where the variable is an instrument for
itself.
Note that the linear combination coeﬃcients for the IV estimate are actually straight-
forward to estimate by means of the empirical moments in (9). If the true data generating
process is non-linear, OLS and IV will generally not lead to the same estimates, even in the
case of exogeneity of schooling. In order to properly assess exogeneity of schooling (as well as
interpret changes in the magnitude of the estimates from the diﬀerent methods in general)
one needs to create a relevant OLS benchmark for comparison with the IV results and to do
so one must obtain the level-speciﬁc OLS estimates of γj, estimate the linear combination
coeﬃcients for IV and then adjust the OLS estimate accordingly.
By appropriately re-adjusting the OLS estimates to be more comparable to the IV esti-
mate, we are essentially answering the question: “What change in expected outcomes would
we predict from an average one-year increase in schooling in the population when the in-
crease in schooling was concentrated at certain levels and we assume that education levels
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(as observed in our data) are exogenous with respect to DP when estimating OLS?”
The most straightforward manner in which to estimate γj is using dummy variables for
each level of education in OLS, see equation (5), but certain features of the Norwegian data
and educational system make this a bit more tricky. As Figure 2 documents, the pre-reform
educational system mainly led to educations of lengths 7 for completed elementary school, 8
for completed framhaldsskole, 10 for complete realskole and 12 for completed secondary school.
Using the data to predict the eﬀects of changing education from 8 to 9 and from 9 to 10 years
is therefore diﬃcult, because the data points at 9 years for the pre-reform period are rare and
most likely consist of a mix of persons who take unusual forms of education (such as at private
middle schools), attend the new middle school (perhaps in a neighboring town) before it was
available in their own area, migrate or are simply subject to data misclassiﬁcation and/or
input error.
The paucity of observations with 9 years of education prior to the reform and 7 and
8 years of schooling after the reform also has implications for the comparison of OLS and
IV estimates. If we pool pre- and post-reform data in OLS estimation, then the marginal
eﬀect estimated for the margin from 8 to 9 years of schooling would largely reﬂect variation
introduced as a result of the reform, since observations with 8 years of education would
largely come from pre-reform data and observations with 9 years of education would largely
come from post-reform data. A simple solution to this diﬃculty is to base OLS estimates
on pre-reform data only and to employ some form of local smoothing in estimating marginal
eﬀects at diﬀerent educational levels. To this end, we estimate level-speciﬁc marginal eﬀects
based on quadratic splines with knots at every second year of schooling on pre-reform data
when estimating marginal eﬀects at diﬀerent levels with OLS.
Formally, quadratic splines are accommodated within a multiple regression framework by
introducing the following variables in the regression equation
sij = δis(si − j)2, j = 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, (10)
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Figure 2: Highest completed education, pre- and post-reform
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where the choices for j are termed the knots. Conceptually, the expected outcome is now
speciﬁed to be a function of s that is continuous, continuously diﬀerentiable everywhere,
locally quadratic, but with shifts in the second order derivatives at the knots. Since s is
discrete in the data, the main purpose is to impose a reasonably smooth function without
imposing unnecessary additional restrictions.
5 Results
5.1 Linear model results
Even though we suspect that linearity of eﬀects does not hold in our case, we ﬁrst present
basic results from a linear framework as a useful baseline speciﬁcation based on standard
methods. Table 2 provides OLS estimates on the eﬀect of years of schooling on the three
outcomes mortality, disability and combined mortality/disability for men and women sep-
arately and together. If we were willing to assume that length of schooling is exogenous
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Table 2: Linear OLS estimates of the eﬀect of years of schooling on mortality and disability
Gender All Men Women
Mortality -0.005 -0.007 -0.003
(-0.006,-0.005) (-0.008,-0.007) (-0.003,-0.002)
Disability -0.020 -0.018 -0.024
(-0.021,-0.020) (-0.019,-0.017) (-0.025,-0.023)
Disability/mortality -0.026 -0.025 -0.026
(-0.027,-0.025) (-0.026,-0.024) (-0.027,-0.025)
Municipality ﬁxed eﬀects x x x
Cohort ﬁxed eﬀects x x x
Gender control x n.a. n.a.
# observations 275.500 141.281 134.219
in OLS analysis, the table would suggest that the eﬀects of schooling on DP are strongly
negative and highly statistically signiﬁcant for the combined disability/mortality measure as
well as mortality and disability separately. One additional year of schooling is associated
with a 2.5 percentage point lower probability of DP/mortality. The eﬀect of education on
mortality is larger for men than women, whereas the eﬀect of education on DP alone is larger
for women. The eﬀect of on the combined DP/mortality outcome is roughly the same for
men and women. Note that the eﬀects suggested by the OLS estimates are rather large in
relative terms, with eﬀects of one extra year of education reducing mortality at age 50 by
about 15 percent and disability use by about 20 percent.
Table 3 provides diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the eﬀect of the reform on education
as well as DP and mortality outcomes. As detailed in Section 5.1, an IV estimate with the
educational reform can be obtained by taking the ratio of the reform eﬀect on DP and the
reform eﬀect on education. These IV estimates, along with the predicted eﬀect of the reform
in the case when years of schooling is exogenous are also presented in Table 3. The main
result from Table 3 is that none of the estimates of the eﬀects of education are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at a 5 % signiﬁcance level. To assess the precision of these null results,
we therefore present results with 95 percent conﬁdence intervals around the estimated eﬀects
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Table 3: Quasi-experimental estimates
Gender All Men Women
Diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates of eﬀect of:
Reform on years of schooling 0.222 0.183 0.262
(0.175,0.268) (0.124,0.242) (0.199,0.325)
Reform on mortality -0.000 -0.002 0.001
(-0.003,0.002) (-0.006,0.003) (-0.002,0.004)
Reform on disability 0.002 0.002 0.003
(-0.002,0.007) (-0.004,0.008) (-0.004,0.010)
Reform on mortality/disability 0.002 0.000 0.004
(-0.003,0.007) (-0.007,0.008) (-0.004,0.011)
IV estimates of eﬀect of:
Years of schooling on mortality -0.002 -0.009 0.004
(-0.013,0.010) (-0.033,0.016) (-0.007,0.015)
Years of schooling on disability 0.011 0,011 0.010
(-0.009,0.031) (-0.021,0.044) (-0.017,0.037)
Years of schooling on mortality/disability 0.009 0.003 0.012
(-0.013,0.030) (-0.036,0.043) (-0.015,0.040)
Municipality ﬁxed eﬀects x x x
Cohort ﬁxed eﬀects x x x
Gender x n.a. n.a.
# observations 275.500 141.916 134.521
Notes: Conﬁdence intervals in parentheses based on robust standard errors clustered on the munic-
ipality level.
and turn our attention to gleaning what we can from these conﬁdence intervals.
However, before turning to that task, we can note that alternative speciﬁcations of the
quasi-experimental analysis yield similar results. In particular, Table 4 reports results from
several of the most important alternative speciﬁcations relevant in this context. A typical
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis focuses on one area that experiences some type of change or
“reform” and another - somehow similar - area that does not and compares the change in
the aﬀected area over time with the concurrent change in the unaﬀected area. The main
identifying assumption of this approach is, therefore, that the trend in the two areas would
have been similar in the absence of the reform. In many cases, this assumption can be
questioned based on possible reasons why one area implemented (or experienced) some type
of notable change. In other words, the simple fact of one area introducing a reform when the
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other did not may itself be strong indication of the two areas being quite diﬀerent, in ways that
are diﬃcult to observe. In the case of the reform studied here, all Norwegian municipalities
do eventually introduce the reform, so that argument in its simplest form does not pose an
immediate obvious threat to the identiﬁcation set-up in this paper. However, there can be a
threat to the identifying assumption in this paper if the timing of the reform was somehow
correlated with diﬀering trends in educational attainment and/or DP/mortality and we are
unable to suﬃciently account for this. We can address this issue in a number of diﬀerent
ways, the two most important of which are presented in Table 4. The results presented under
“Alt 1” use only those municipalities that introduced the reform in the period 1951-1958,
since other municipalities implicitly only serve as controls (for time trends) in our analysis.
If early or late reform municipalities diﬀer greatly in trends in educational attaintment, DP
or mortality over cohorts, then allowing these to function as part of the “control group” in
the analysis can bias results. The results presented under “Alt 3” in Table 4 speciﬁes and
estimates a separate linear trend for each municipality, i.e. allows for ﬂexibility in the relevant
time trend for each municipality. Finally, Table 4 also reports results (under “Alt 2”) with
the last pre-reform cohort included in the analysis, since these are otherwise excluded from
analysis. As expected, this gives a somewhat weaker ﬁrst stage estimate (the reform eﬀect
on schooling).
5.2 Nonlinear eﬀects of years of schooling
In the section above we established that the eﬀects of education on disability estimated
with an IV approach were not statistically diﬀerent from zero. However, the increased sta-
tistical uncertainty implicit in the IV-approach can make it diﬃcult to interpret that result
as clear evidence of education truly having no (large) eﬀect on DP. In this section, we would
therefore like to gain a deeper understanding of the extent to which the results presented here
shed light on the possible extent (or limitations on the extent) to which education aﬀects DP
use. As elucidated in Sections 4.2 this requires that we also consider possible non-linearities
in the eﬀect of education in a manner akin to that implied by the IV approach. In estimating
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Table 4: Robustness of quasi-experimental estimates
Baseline Alt 1 Alt 2 Alt 3
Eﬀect of reform on schooling 0.222 0.253 0.203 0.272
(0.024) (0.026) (0.020) (0.029)
Eﬀect of reform on disability/mortality 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Eﬀect of years of schooling on disability/mortality 0.009 0.013 0.009 0.005
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
# observations 275.500 205.456 302.631 275.500
Gender x x x x
Cohort ﬁxed eﬀect x x x x
Municipality ﬁxed eﬀects x x x x
Municipality speciﬁc linear trends x
Including immediate pre-reform cohort x
Including only municipalities with treatment 1951-1958 x
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on the municipality level in parantheses.
and presenting results on the relevance of diﬀerent linear combination coeﬃcients in OLS and
IV estimates, this section will also document that the reform shifted educational attainment
precisely in that part of the educational distribution where we might expect to also ﬁnd the
largest eﬀects of education. This, in turn, aﬀects the baseline which is needed to properly
assess the (range of) eﬀect sizes which can be reasonably ruled out based on this analysis.
Such assessment can take place for both diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the eﬀect of
the reform on disability/mortality and IV estimates of the eﬀect of (a year of) schooling on
disability/mortality.
We saw in Section 4.2 that IV estimates a speciﬁc linear combination of marginal eﬀects
with coeﬃcients that can be estimated from the data in the case of a non-linear relationship
between the (potentially) endogenous variable and the outcome. Table 5 presents the dif-
ferent coeﬃcients used in the linear combination of marginal eﬀects implicit in IV and OLS
estimation. When looking at the IV coeﬃcients, we see that the eﬀect of the reform was
heavily concentrated on the margin going from 8-9 years, since that coeﬃcient was, by far,
the largest. There is also clearly some “weight” placed on the 7-8 margin. Furthermore, the
coeﬃcient for the 9-10 margin was negative. This means that some individuals who would
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Table 5: Linear combination coeﬃcients in IV and OLS for diﬀerent levels of education
Education level (margin) IV OLS
7-8 years 0.185 0.018
8-9 years 0.788 0.045
9-10 years -0.183 0.107
10-11 years 0.091 0.157
11-12 years 0.073 0.161
12-13 years 0.036 0.143
13-14 years 0.025 0.125
14-15 years 0.005 0.098
15-16 years -0.002 0.078
16-17 years -0.012 0.044
17-18 years -0.005 0.022
18-19 years 0.000 0.001
19-20 years -0.000 0.000
Notes: See equations (6) and (9).
have obtained 10 years of education in the old system, only obtained 9 years of education
after the reform. Since it would have been natural for some students to end education after
completing realskole under the old system, it is reasonable to expect that 10 years of educa-
tion was a fairly common level of educational attainment prior to the reform. (See also Figure
2.) After the reform, 10 years of education would have corresponded to completing one year
of upper secondary education, which would not be such a natural point for ending education.
Hence, the situation documented in Table 5 is not surprising. From Table 5 we can also note
that the reform induces some people to achieve education beyond 10 years, as some of the
coeﬃcients for the 10-11, 11-12, 12-13 and 13-14 margins are small but positive. After that,
the coeﬃcents are largely negligible. In other words, Table 5 gives us little reason to suspect
that the reform inﬂuenced educational obtainment beyond the secondary level. Finally, note
that the OLS linear combination coeﬃcients are very diﬀerent from the IV weights. OLS
emphasizes the margins from 9-14 years of education and gives very little weigh to the 8-9
margin. Hence, that alone would lead us to expect that there might be quite large diﬀerences
between OLS and IV results.
Table 6 ﬁrst presents the diﬀerent (non-linear) marginal OLS eﬀects based on quadratic
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splines for 2-year intervals. The marginal eﬀects are clearly decreasing in level of education
for all three outcomes. The eﬀects are strongest for the lowest educational levels and seem
to disappear altogether for education beyond 14 year.
Table 7 shows our benchmark comparison measures derived form the coeﬃcients in Table
5 and the marginal eﬀects from Table 6. The OLS results originally presented in Table
2 diﬀer from the OLS results presented as “OLS benchmark” in Table 7 for two reasons:
the smoothing assumptions imposed by the quadratic spline used in the estimation of the
marginal eﬀects and the restriction of estimation to pre-reform data in the estimation of
the benchmark. We see that the orginal OLS results diﬀer little from the re-adjusted OLS
benchmark results.
The IV benchmark measure reweights the marginal coeﬃcients in Table 6 based on the IV
linear coeﬃcients in Table 5 and can be interpreted as the target we would expect our IV to
estimate if we were willing to assume that education was exogeneous when estimating OLS.
We see that these measures are twice as high as OLS for the disability measure and even
higher relative to OLS for the measures involving mortality. This reﬂects the fact that the
reform we use as instrument aﬀected the educational distribution precisely along the margins
where the eﬀects of education on outcomes might be expected to be the strongest.
The 95 percent conﬁdence interval for the eﬀect of education on disability/mortality with
IV ranges from roughly -0.013 to 0.030. Thus, with such a conservative choice of conﬁdence
limits, the data cannot rule out that one additional year could have caused a 1.3 percentage
point decrease in disability/mortality. Similarly the lower conﬁdence limit of the eﬀect of
education an disability alone is a decrease of about 1 percentage point. Comparing these
conﬁdence limits with the benchmark comparison estimates in Table 7 indicates that any
causal eﬀects of education on disability pension use revealed by the exogenous variation in
education generated by the reform is unlikely to be more than 30 percent of the magnitude
suggested by the appropriately re-adjusted benchmark comparisons. The mortality results
from the quasi-experimental analysis are not suﬃciently precise to rule out eﬀects of the same
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Table 6: Estimates of marginal eﬀects of years of schooling based on quadratic splines within
OLS
Margin Mortality Disability Mortality / Disability
7-8 years -0.021 (0.003) -0.031 (0.005) -0.053 (0.005)
8-9 years -0.013 (0.001) -0.038 (0.001) -0.051 (0.002)
9-10 years -0.005 (0.001) -0.037 (0.002) -0.042 (0.002)
10-11 years 0.003 (0.001) -0.028 (0.002) -0.024 (0.002)
11-12 years 0.002 (0.001) -0.021 (0.001) -0.019 (0.002)
12-13 years -0.010 (0.002) -0.016 (0.002) -0.026 (0.003)
13-14 years -0.011 (0.001) -0.009 (0.002) -0.020 (0.002)
14-15 years -0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) -0.002 (0.004)
15-16 years -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003)
16-17 years -0.007 (0.004) -0.006 (0.006) -0.014 (0.007)
17-18 years -0.004 (0.005) -0.005 (0.007) -0.008 (0.008)
18-19 years 0.009 (0.021) 0.006 (0.032) 0.016 (0.037)
19-20 years -0.034 (0.138) -0.014 (0.213) -0.049 (0.245)
Table 7: Comparing estimates with benchmarks
Mortality Disability Mortality/Disability
OLS (from Table 2) -0.005 -0.020 -0.026
(95 pct. conf. int.) (-0.006,-0.005) (-0.021,-0.020) (-0.027,-0.025)
OLS benchmark -0.004 -0.017 -0.022
(95 pct. conf. int.) (-0.005,-0.004) (-0.018,-0.017) (-0.023,-0.021)
IV (from Table 3) -0.002 0.011 0.009
(95 pct. conf. int.) (-0.013,0.010) (-0.009,0.031) (-0.013,0.030)
IV benchmark -0.013 -0.034 -0.047
(95 pct. conf. int.) (-0.011,-0.015) (-0.037,-0.031) (-0.051,-0.043)
magnitude as the benchmark comparison estimates with a 95 percent conﬁdence level.
6 Concluding discussion
If the observed statistical relationship between education length and the propensity to
become a disability pensioner was largely driven by a causal eﬀect of education on disability,
we would expect that the compulsory schooling reform described in this paper would have
been a potent means for reducing disability use. We would also expect to be able to uncover
evidence of a large causal eﬀect of education on DP use from the quasi-experimental analysis
of such a reform. In fact, we were unable to uncover any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the
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reform and, as a result, are also unable to provide conclusive evidence that general education
at roughly the middle school level has an eﬀect on DP use. When we take non-linearities in
the eﬀect of education into account to provide an appropriate benchmark comparison based
on properly weight non-linear OLS results, we see that the results presented in this study
largely rule out causal eﬀects of education on DP/mortality larger than 30% of the eﬀect
suggested by basic OLS results. In other words, we can conclude that, at most, a little over
one-quarter of the relationship between education and DP and/or mortality observed in basic
OLS results might be due to the causal eﬀect of education on DP use, with point estimates
pointing towards no eﬀect at all. Hence, the relationship between education and DP generally
observed in descriptive analyses appears to be mostly driven by other explanations, such as
selection eﬀects or third factors which aﬀect both educational attainment and DP use.
From a policy perspective, this means that we would be unwise to assume that broad
interventions for raising the general level of schooling can make more than a very small
dent in aggregate DP use. However, these results should not be misinterpreted as indicating
that educational interventions can never have an eﬀect on DP. More correctly, this study
suggests that broad, non-targeted education policies at roughly the middle school level are
not alone suﬃcient to inﬂuence outcomes such as DP. There is little evidence to suggest
that the additional skills and/or knowledge from an extra year or two of general schooling
at roughly age 15 would have been enough – or of a nature – to greatly impact a person’s
disability status far in the future.
It may also seem puzzling that the educational reform used in this analysis has previously
revealed causal eﬀects of education on both earnings (Aakvik et al., 2010) and on general
cognitive ability (“IQ”) (Brinch and Galloway, 2012) but does not generate an eﬀect on dis-
ability use. Based on previous studies (Conti and Heckman (2010); Cutler and Lleras-Muney
(2010)) it seems reasonable to assume that both earnings and cognitive ability are important
factors in generating health outcomes. However, other studies suggest that DP use is strongly
associated with job features, such as job control and high physical demands (manual work)
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(Krokstad et al., 2002), which might not change so dramatically with an additional year or
two of education, due, perhaps, to general equilibrium eﬀects. In other words, the increase in
schooling and/or cognitive ability generated by the increase in education due to the reform
might not be enough to change other important elements of a person’s job situation or shift
a person’s relative position in the labor market, even if it does improve cognitive skills, make
individuals more productive and lead to slightly higher earnings.
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